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The traditional CPI measure has many drawbacks, when used for very different 
purposes, and it is not at all surprising that a great deal of work has been devoted to its 
improvement. Besides seasonal adjustment, various other techniques have been developed to 
find the “core” inflation index. Although a generally accepted definition of core inflation 
does not exist, the literature converges towards identifying certain desirable properties that a 
“good” core index must possess. 
After reviewing the literature we describe how the publication of a core index fits into 
the monetary policy strategy of the National Bank of Hungary. Monetary policy both in the 
form of setting the instruments and by communicating to the public is geared to arrive at a 
mutual understanding with the markets. By publishing a core inflation index, the NBH aims 
at providing the public with a price measure that can function as a co-ordination device 
between policy makers and market participants. As the “index number” problem is clearly 
connected with relative price changes, we analyze in some depth this issue, too. We argue 
that there have been clearly visible tendencies in relative price developments that jeopardize 
some of the traditional uses of inflation measures. Our results suggest that a substantial 
amount of noise and apparent seasonality have come about as a result of government 
decisions. Finally we muster some possible procedures to define core indices in Hungary, by 
comparing their smoothness and forecasting ability from several points of view. Our 
conclusion is that there is no overwhelming reason to abandon the current “exclusion” 
approach toward the core.  
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1. Introduction 
The concept and measurement of core or underlying inflation has been given 
increasing attention recently. However, one can find several definitions in the 
literature, and different authors disagree on measurement as well. Most core 
definitions implicitly entail at least one of the following two requirements: the core 
must measure what part of inflation is attributable to monetary policy, and it must 
have little noise in a statistical sense, too. Most current core definitions intend to 
achieve both of these goals. The two requirements can be unified if one believes 
that monetary policy is less hectic than the real economy. Though this latter 
assumption does not appear to have any emprical foundation, we may say that it is 
implicitly contained in most core inflation definitions. 
However, as Wynne (1999) points out, monetary inflation, that is inflation 
attributable to monetary policy, is not a well-defined concept. Even if we had the 
simple theory entailed by the quantity equation cum an exogenous supply of money 
we should notice that prices are determined jointly by the money supply, the output 
and the velocity processes. Providing the money supply is independent of the other 
two processes, the impact of monetary policy can be perfectly measured by money 
growth, and though it would have a positive correlation with the price index, it 
would not solely determine it. With an endogenous policy rule the problem is more 
difficult, as the underlying processes are not orthogonal. It is not by chance that 
today researchers studying the effects of money look for monetary innovations, i.e. 
shocks to monetary policy that are independent of the state of the economy. 
Inflation, however, cannot be attributed only to monetary suprises. For instance, a 
totally deterministic rule to increase the money supply by 20 per cent per year 
would certainly lead to a positive rate of inflation, but it would not necessarily 
involve any innovation in the statistical sense. 
The core is frequently identified with the central tendency in price movements, a 
so-called common component in individual price changes. At first sight the 
common component and limited influence estimators (Dynamic Factor Index, 
median, trimmed means), proposed by Bryan-Cecchetti (1994) and Bryan-
Cecchetti-Wiggins II (1997), pick on the smoothness or trend approach rather than 
wish to measure the effects of monetary policy. They assess which limited influence 
estimator is best capable of tracing trends, defined as a long moving average. This 
smoothness approach can be related to Blinder’s proposal (Blinder (1997)) to define 
a core via its ability to predict future inflation.  
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Probably the most conservative approach is the “ex food and energy” method. 
The underlying idea is that we can somehow divine that certain events cause 
temporary price level changes. These events are frequently identified with 
temporary supply shocks, though nothing excludes the possibility that we would 
like to clean our inflation measure from temporary demand changes as well. It is 
widely believed that prices belonging to certain groups, like energy and foodstuffs, 
are dominated by such temporary factors, justifying their exclusion from the overall 
price index. This approach is simple, and has a lot of intuitive appeal that makes it 
acceptable not only to central banks but financial market participants as well. 
Though in no case does a clear theoretical foundation exist for the actual 
implementation, the individual instances that call for exclusion seem to be 
understandable. 
A related issue is deducting the effects of indirect tax changes. The serious 
problem we encounter here is whether an indirect tax change is a temporary shift in 
the price level or in inflation. As Wynne (1999) points out there is no a priori 
reason to believe that inflation remains unaffected by an indirect tax change, at least 
for some time, and the empirical identification of the size of an indirect tax change 
is anything but easy. 
It must be noticed that limited influence estimators can also result in filtering out 
temporary shocks. The difference between the exclusion methods and limited 
influence estimators lies in the nature of how zero weights are applied to certain 
prices. In terms of the limited influence estimators, zero weights are changing over 
time and are procedurally defined, whereas in the case of the (pure) exclusion 
methods exclusion is made once and for all, and is based on extraneous 
information. 
Considering the above-mentioned problems this paper takes an agnostic and 
pragmatic view on core inflation measurement. Rather than aiming at an ideal 
construction, which may not exist, we start from the observation that core inflation 
indicators are used (or not used) by central banks that have different goals, 
operating procedures etc. We claim that central bankers may have their own 
purposes to calculate and publish core inflation, and these purposes are the main 
determinants of the adoption of any specific core inflation measure. We interpret 
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The paper illustrates this idea by explaining the use of core inflation in Hungary. 
To understand the context a short summary of the Hungarian macroeconomy and 
monetary policy is offered in Section 2. Then in Section 3 the Hungarian 
application of the core inflation concept is described. The topic of Section 4 is 
relative price changes that have caused substantial difficulties for monetary policy 
makers, and we see the search for a “core” as an attempt to alleviate many of these. 
In Section 5 we ask how potential core inflation measures perform in terms of 
requirements a useful measure must satisfy. Section 6 concludes by noticing that 
simple traditional core inflation measures have seemed to be superior to more 
fanciful indexes for the particular case of Hungary. The last qualification is 
important, since our whole approach is based on the idea that the best core measure 
is country and time specific. 
2. Economic and Monetary Policy Background in Hungary 
2.1. A Short History 
Hungary is a transition economy with special features. The following is a brief 
overview of some of its characteristics that bear relevance on the understanding of 
its monetary policy and the inflationary process. For a more detailed analysis of the 
period before 1998, Surányi-Vincze (1998) can be consulted, whereas the most 
recent developments are covered in the various issues of the Quarterly Review on 
Inflation, published by the National Bank of Hungary. For a comparative analysis 
see Wyplosz (1999) and the studies in Cotarelli-Szapáry (1998), in particular Begg 
(1998). 
At the beginning of the 1990s, Hungary, like other formerly socialist 
economies, had to undergo significant structural changes, and a large scale 
reorientation of trade. As a result output declined and unemployment rose in the 
early ’90s, while there were sharp increases in the price level. As the country 
inherited a distorted relative price structure, inflation was accompanied by huge 
relative price changes. 
Fiscal expansion and domestic demand led to recovery before 1995, which 
resulted in increasing indebtedness, and in high real wages. Monetary policy’s 
“balancing” via devaluations and higher interest rates was unsuccessful. Returning 
to a sustainable fiscal path required genuine fiscal adjustment, which took place in 
1995, and was supplemented by a step devaluation. Restoring solvency was 
accompanied by an adjustment of real wages, and this, together with accelerated  
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privatization in a stable macroeconomic environment, led eventually not just to 
recovery, but to rather high growth, too. Monetary policy was supporting fiscal 
policy by providing nominal predictability in terms of inflation and exchange rate 
changes. 
Inflation in the 1990’s showed ups and downs. First, the rate of increase in 
consumer prices accelerated, reaching its peak in the middle of 1991. Then came a 
rapid disinflation, followed by a period when the rate of inflation stabilized. In early 
1995 a short episode of acceleration of inflation to levels comparable to those in 
1991 occured, and it was followed by an almost continuous disinflation. 
Table 1 
Hungary: Some Macroeconomic Data 
  GDP annual growth 
rate (%) 
Central govern-
ment debt, total  
(% of GDP) 
Current account 
balance 
(% of  GDP) 
CPI (% change 
year on year) 
1990 -3.5    1.1 28.9 
1991 -11.9  74  1.2  35.0 
1992 -3.1  78  0.9 23.0 
1993 -0.6  90  -11.0 22.5 
1994 2.9  87  -9.8  18.8 
1995 1.5  85  -5.7  28.2 
1996 1.3  72  -3.8  23.6 
1997 4.6  63  -2.2  18.3 
1998 5.1  61  -4.8  14.3 
1999 4.3  61  -4.1  10.0 
2.2. The policy of the National Bank of Hungary 
The 1998 Annual Report of the NBH states: “The National Bank of Hungary 
considers the sustainable reduction of inflation and – in the long run – achieving 
price stability as its most important tasks.” In order to understand what these terms 
mean it is best to quote from the first Quarterly Report on Inflation, which 
summarizes the Bank’s official stance on the nature of the inflationary process and 
its tasks therewith. 
“The National Bank of Hungary (NBH) sees three factors which are 
predominantly important in determining inflation. The development of aggregate 
demand and supply is the most important factor for sustainable disinflation. The 
second factor is inflationary expectations, which play a significant role both in 
producers’ pricing behaviour and in nominal wage negotiations. The third 
component is imported inflation, which is the sum of foreign inflation and the  
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nominal depreciation of the Forint. These three components determine the trend of 
inflation. The inflation rate can, of course, be influenced by ad hoc factors as well, 
such as tax changes or supply shocks causing one-off shifts in the price level. The 
National Bank of Hungary believes that the significance of rapid relative price 
changes and structural adjustments –which were major determinants of the 
inflation process earlier – decreased as the transition to a market economy ended.” 
Thus the Bank thinks in terms of a certain decomposition of actually observed 
inflation. It contains a trend determined by the three factors mentioned above, and a 
temporary component which has been predominantly influenced by certain relative 
price changes (See next Section). 
The short-term framework of policy contains a crawling band for the nominal 
exchange rate, for which repeated announcements are made jointly by the 
government and the NBH. Within this framework the NBH’s main short-term target 
is to keep the nominal exchange rate within the announced bands, if necessary by 
exchange market intervention, but also by setting appropriate short-term interest 
rates. Another quotation illustrates the principles followed. 
“Sustainable disinflation is possible only through the cooperation of fiscal and 
monetary policies. The maintenance of the preannounced crawling peg exchange 
rate regime influences the pricing behavior and inflationary expectations of market 
participants, and the gradual reduction in the monthly devaluation rate confirms 
the credibility of the monetary authorities’ inflation forecast. (...) The significance 
of the exchange rate path lies in its credibility and sustainability, thus the expected 
depreciation is built-in within pricing behavior, reducing the inertia of inflationary 
expectations and enabling monetary authorities to set a lower goal for inflation.” 
To summarize: for the NBH price stability is a long-term goal, which is only 
achievable by a process of sustainable disinflation. Sustainability is derived from 
the idea that too fast and not coordinated attempts to disinflate have frequently 
resulted in currency or capital market crises in developing countries where 
government and foreign debt were not negligible factors. The longer-term exchange 
rate strategy must be understood from this concept of sustainability. The NBH 
(together with the government) would normally not increase the rate of devaluation, 
though there exists no explicit promise to that effect, but the size of cuts in that rate 
is influenced by macroeconomic developments between two announcements. 
Deterioration in foreign debt level, acceleration of government indebtedness or  
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unfavorable inflationary developments (resulting in real appreciation) are taken, in 
particular, as indicators of a more delicate macroeconomic balance, and would, 
thus, militate against further cuts in the announced depreciation. Policy puts an 
emphasis on shaping expectations without “surprising” the public. The goal is to 
achieve a mutual understanding with the market. Policy both in the form of setting 
instruments (exchange rate bands and interest rates) and by communicating to the 
public is geared to arrive at this mutual understanding. The publication of the 
Quarterly Report is to be seen in this perspective. In the words of the first issue: 
“The objective of the Quarterly is to regularly provide the public with a view on the 
current and expected path of inflation and also about how the central bank 
evaluates the macroeconomic environment which determines inflation. By doing so, 
it is hoped that a much wider public than before will be familiar with the objectives 
of monetary policy and the central bank’s measures will be easier to follow and to 
understand.” 
We conclude from the above description that the core inflation index, 
published by the NBH, has its main role in the communication strategy of the NBH. 
The Bank’s internal analysis of inflation is quite detailed, and the inflation reports 
exhibit much more about inflation than just the CPI and the core, where the latter is 
called explicitly as the trend in inflation. By publishing a core inflation index the 
NBH aims at providing the public with a price index which can function as a 
coordination device, and can play a useful role in the improvement of mutual 
understanding between monetary policy and market participants. This price index 
(core inflation index) must reflect those developments that the NBH thinks 
important, and would take into account when making decisions. Or looking at it 
from another angle it must not contain irrevelant information. Thus, for example, a 
temporary increase in the rate of inflation due to nonpersistent supply shocks would 
not have an effect on central bank policies, therefore these should be somehow 
extracted from the core index. 
3. Implementation of the Core Inflation Concept in Hungary 
It can be argued that excluding known temporary shocks is reasonable 
provided we want to obtain a smooth inflation index that is a good predictor of 
future inflation and is, at the same time, close to the (ex post defined) trend. The 
Hungarian approach is indeed an exclusion approach. Since July 1998 the NBH has 
regularly published a core inflation index which excludes from the consumer price  
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index the effects of price changes in seasonal foodstuffs (eggs, potatoes, vegetables, 
fruit), solid and liquid fuel (coal, briquette, cooking coal, firewood, heating fuel) 
and gasoline. The core inflation index calculated in this way covers 91 % of the 
original consumer price index. The prices excluded are rather variable and the 
resulting core index is less variable than the total CPI. On the other hand, the 
respective relative prices do not have clear trends, thus, in the long term, the 
average core is close to the average CPI (See Section 5 below). With regard to good 
communicability these features are very important. At first the variability of the 
index may lead to confusion and the possibility of diverging expectations, which 
would result in difficulties with coordination. On the other hand, the NBH’s rule of 
not cutting the rate of devaluation if there is a tendency towards “excessive” real 
exchange rate appreciation calls for an index which closely follows the level of the 
CPI, which is a sort of cost of living index (Cost of living considerations are crucial 
for setting wages, while nominal wages too high relative to the exchange rate can 
deteriorate the exporting sectors’ profitability). It can be seen from Table II. in 
Wynne ( 1999) that this approach satisfies some important criteria, like being 
computable in real time, understandability, and not changing frequently. It is 
perhaps curious that recently the Hungarian Central Statistical Ofice (CSO) started 
to publish its core inflation index based on similar principles, but excluding some 
20 per cent of the CPI. This may not follow the precept of being close to the CPI, 
which can be explained by the fact that the CSO does not possess policy motives. 
See, however, our results in Section 5. 
We know that statistical definitions change sometimes. Indeed it is plausible 
that such changes give us very valuable information on the purposes of those who 
initiate them. The NBH deviated from the calculation of the core inflation after 
about one year. The break with the implicit rules was prompted by a specific event, 
but the case is interesting and we can learn some lessons from it. It was a 
governmental decision to cut subsidies for a number of patented drugs in the 
summer of 1999. It was also well known that cheap generic substitutes existed for 
each of these medicaments, thus economic rationality predicted that the resulting 
price increase would call for a very sharp substitution effect, and the drugs with 
higher consumer prices would lose market share almost totally. The CSO as an 
agency whose operations are directed by formal rules refused to accept this logic 
and, having no factual grounds for changing the weights attached to these drugs, 
used its old procedure to calculate its price index. This resulted in a substantial  
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increase in the rate of inflation, namely by 0.8 % in two months.
1  On the other 
hand the NBH changed its practice and redefined the core index, by excluding now 
drugs as well
2, but without making a full backward adjustment. As a result, in the 
following year the difference between the CPI and the NBH core was almost one 
per cent. This made an important qualitative difference: whereas the NBH core 
showed continuous disinflation, the CSO core indicated a reversal in the 
disinflationary process.
3  
Acting this way the NBH may have seemed to behave in an arbitrary manner. On 
the other hand, the drug price increase did not just qualify to being a temporary 
shock to the price level. In terms of the above economic reasoning, what happened 
in fact was a very gross case of erroneous measurement, i.e. substitution bias, which 
is a general property of the Laspeyres index. Was the NBH wrong to make the ad 
hoc adjustment? We think transparency did not suffer since the procedure was open 
and clearly explained and probably well understood. One may object that footnotes 
might also have done the trick. However, it is known that readers frequently fail to 
notice footnotes. 
One may say that had the NBH introduced a limited influence estimator the 
problem would not have emerged at all. As similar cases can very well appear in the 
future, the introduction of a well-chosen limited influence estimator may be 
advisable. One traditional objection against this is the supposed difficulty with its 
understandability by the public (see Wynne (1999) Table II). However, it is 
doubtful whether the general public would care too much, whereas professional 
analysts must be intelligent and educated enough to absorb such a novelty (See our 
related results reported in Section 5). 
4. Relative Price Issues
4 
Problems with defining a core inflation concept are related to relative price 
changes. Also as the above quotation shows that the National Bank of Hungary has 
been very much concerned with interpreting relative price changes. What are the 
                                                 
1 Drugs had a weight of 1.8 %, and their index rose by 45 % in two months. 
2 A full deduction of the 0.8 % may overstate the substitution effect, but it is believed that this bias is not 
substantial. 
3 As we were not bound by previous publications, we made the full backward adjustment in our 
calculations. Thus, before mid-99 our data slightly deviate from the core time series published by the 
NBH. 
4 This section heavily draws on Vincze (1999).  
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sources of the most important relative price changes that may bear relevance on the 
core inflation problem? 
1. Seasonality. 
2. Other cyclical behavior at lower frequencies. 
3. Indirect tax changes. 
4. Government policies with respect to regulated prices. 
5. Certain prices changing less frequently than others. 
6. Supply shocks. 
7. Relative demand shocks. 
8. Trends in relative prices due, for instance, to productivity growth differ-
entials. 
In the folowing we will present a decomposition of the Hungarian CPI. We will 
not discuss each of the above problems, but many of these will recur during the 
investigation in different guises. 
4.1. Relative Consumer Prices 
At the beginning of transition there was a widespread feeling that transition 
would require very large changes in relative prices. The reason for this was obvious. 
Under the socialist regime the price system had not accomplished its function of 
equilibrating supply and demand, as social or other considerations militated for 
keeping certain prices low and others unreasonably high. (The latter was largely 
helped by the existence of trade barriers). Needless to say, price distortions might 
exist in any economy, not only in centrally planned ones. However, the common 
perception was that here the problem had been more marked, and the warranted 
changes larger. Certainly some of the required relative price adjustment occurred 
rather early in transition, usually following immediately upon price and trade 
liberalization. However, it has been observed that relative price adjustment has 
proved to be a rather prolonged process that has not come to an end in most of the 
countries concerned (See Koen-De Masi  (1997)). 
First we ask whether we are able to identify “tradable” prices. Obviously if two 
goods have identical physical attributes, but are consumed at different locations, 
their prices might not be necessarily the same. So for purists the concept of tradable  
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is a chimera. One can be more pragmatic, however, and can ask whether the main 
implication of tradability (the Law of One Price) is a satisfactory approximation. 
Usually we must avail ourselves with something even more modest, and we have to 
look for the fulfillment of the “Law of One Price Change”, i.e. approximately 
identical rate of change, expressed, of course, in the same currency. We would have 
our best change of finding tradable prices that satisfy this definition if we were 
looking for intermediate goods. Goods and services whose prices make up the CPI 
usually have some non-tradable content (local services etc.), thus are not perfect 
candidates. Unfortunately, data availability causes us to confine our attention to the 
CPI basket. The question is whether it is possible to find some part of it that can, for 
practical purposes, be identified with a tradable price index. 
Our approach of identification was the following. From standard 
microeconomics we can suppose that the marginal cost of products and services is 
some function of input prices as well as of the amount supplied. If markups are 
stationary then an approximately tradable good can be defined as one whose price 
depends only on foreign inflation and on the nominal exchange rate in the long run. 
Neither domestic demand in a small economy, nor other costs, like nominal wages, 
should have an impact on an ideal tradable price asymptotically. This reasoning 
suggested the specification of autoregressive distributed lag models for each price 
index that make up the Hungarian CPI, where regressors included the nominal 
exchange rate, nominal wages and seasonal dummies. The estimates of long run 
parameters are consistent in a wide range of circumstances (see Pesaran-Sin-Smith 
(1997)). If we disregard foreign inflation, which can be taken as approximately zero 
in view of the very low inflation in the EU, an (informal) pre-test of tradability is as 
follows: a good is hypothetically tradable if the nominal exchange rate alone is 
significant in its equation, and the long-run parameter of the exchange rate is not far 
from 1 (Because of the noisiness of individual series we could not really strive to 
have a more formal test). 
Based on this probe less than half the prices pass the hurdle. A very important 
observation is that all the goods classified as durable belong to this category! 
Taking their aggregate index as the subject of the test one gets the same result with 
a long-run coefficient of 1.02. Next, one can test whether this aggregate is 
cointegrated with nominal exchange rates at different sample periods. Provided the 
answer is positive this subcomponent of the CPI can be regarded as a good 
approximation of a tradable price index.  
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Augmented Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Peron tests were carried out for the 
difference of the log tradable price index and the log nominal exchange rate for 
three subperiods. It turned out that the period between the March stabilization in 
1995 and the Russian crisis in 1998 is where the null of no cointegration can be 
rejected most confidently. Including the Russian crisis would lead to a weaker 
result, and for the whole period no cointegration can not be rejected at traditional 
significance levels. 
Thus we adopted the durable subcomponent of the CPI, representing about 10-15 
% of the total, as a proxy for the price index of tradables. One can see from Chart 2
5 
that the relative prices of durables have followed a clear negative trend, and from 
Chart 3-7 that individual prices within this class have had the same property, 
making this subgroup exhibit a very high degree of internal similarity. 
Having identified a price subaggregate that can be reasonably well explained by 
exchange rate movements we proceeded to investigate relative price changes. It 
appeared that further disaggregation was necessary. Both on a priori and statistical 
grounds one can distinguish seven further subaggregates. 
1.  Non-energy  administered (regulated) prices, characterized by infrequent 
changes. Chart 2 shows that relative administered prices have exhibited a positive 
trend, and have grown substantially. They show a zigzag picture, undergoing short 
periods of large hikes, and more protracted periods of almost no change. This is true 
for most individual prices, though some of the individual relative prices have 
remained virtually unchanged on average (Chart 3-1). 
2. Energy prices. Energy prices have partly been regulated, and also exposed to 
world price developments, i.e. supply shocks from our point of view. The relative 
energy price was declining at mild pace until 1995, when it rose steeply, followed 
by the continuation of an upward trend (Chart 2). This shape was due to deliberate 
policies, which had checked energy price increases before 1995 for social reasons, 
but the correction of the relative energy price was part of the fiscal adjustment 
package. From Chart 3-2 one can observe that individual prices within this 
subgroup show high variation. 
Several utility and basic commodity prices are still regulated to some extent. In 
some periods governments were suspected of using price regulation to fight 
                                                 
5 In the charts relative prices are defined as log ratios to the unadjusted CPI.  
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inflationary pressures by freezing certain prices belonging to their dominion. 
Indeed, this behavior was not unique to transition countries; many other developing 
countries saw something similar during stabilization attempts. These price freezes 
are usually discredited as myopic in the sense that they postpone rather than resolve 
the inflation problem. Again this claim must have a lot of relevance for particular 
cases. However, it would be a mistake to regard it as universal truth and deplore 
every government intervention in monopolistic price setting as unwise and short-
termist. It is obvious that if price regulation is binding, monopolists could increase 
profits by setting their relative prices higher. Thus there is an inherent tendency, 
especially for private regulated monopolies, but also for state monopolies, provided 
that managers have preferences for higher profits, to elbow for price increases. 
Whether current relative prices are below or above competitive (marginal cost) 
prices must be largely private information, thus lobbying for higher prices is not 
inconceivable. By the same token, in an inflationary environment, where nominal 
prices should be changed from time to time and this repricing should be based on 
expectations on price formation elsewhere in the economy, regulated monopolists 
are prone to prefer mistakes on the upper side, that is, achieving higher ex post 
relative prices than expected. This is in sharp contrast with rational behavior in 
industries where competitive pressure is higher, since in those industries 
overpricing is as harmful as underpricing. The conclusion from the above reasoning 
is that regulated monopolists tend to constantly push towards relative price 
increases, but whether this is justified on efficiency grounds cannot be decided a 
priori, and the outcome may also depend on the extent of regulatory capture. The 
fundamental point here is that under imperfect competition cum regulation there is a 
range of indeterminacy for relative prices. This is why questions like the one raised 
by Blanchard (1998) seem not to be easy to tackle. Blanchard asks whether 
governments must decide to bring relative administered prices to their correct level 
before or after disinflation. This, however, might only be possible to decide if we 
accept that a unique correct level exists. This also means that governments cannot 
have a hands-off stance on this issue, and should take responsibility for price setting 
in this area. This should involve a clearly defined strategy, rather than some 
quantitative assessment of what the correct prices should be. 
3. Excisable goods (alcohol, tobacco, car fuel). The separate treatment of this 
subgroup explains by the heavy tax burden
6 that distorts the evolution of the prices 
                                                 
6 Excise taxes add up to roughly 5% of GDP in Hungary, or about 10% of gross budgetary revenues.  
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on these markets, making them, at the same time, very much dependent on the 
current fiscal stance. Excisable good relative prices do not show a zigzag pattern, 
but certain big changes have occurred in them. On the whole they exhibited a 
slightly negative price trend, which was notably reversed for some time in 1995 
(Chart 3-6). 
4. Processed food prices. These have been pretty stable in relative terms (Chart 
2), and they constitute an internally coherent subgroup (Chart 3-4). 
5. Non-processed food prices. These seem to be relatively stable in the long 
term, but have had cycles, exhibiting not just very large short-term fluctuations, but 
fluctuations that have apparently been persistent (Chart 2). The subgroup is not at 
all homogenous (Chart 3-5), showing that here local market effects clearly 
dominate. 
Non-processed food prices provide an additional input to uncertainty in inflation. 
Besides the natural reasons for the existence of potentially large supply shocks, 
changing and unpredictable agricultural policies have played an important role. 
Initial relative price distortions existed but since agricultural price structures in 
western countries are also distorted it is difficult to see what the long-term behavior 
will be. This uncertainty is especially important for transition countries since CPI 
baskets sometimes contain as large a share of food prices as 40%, whereas large 
fluctuations in food prices may be uninformative about underlying trends. 
Foodstuffs are certainly tradable and traded, despite significant barriers. Still 
trade barriers have caused substantial differences between the level of food prices in 
Hungary, and, say, those in Western Europe. EU accession can accelerate the 
disappearance of the gap, and even its expectation can have an effect on price 
determination in the interim period. Recent research has shown that the level of 
agricultural protection in transition countries varies (Banse (1999)), Hungary’s 
being much lower than that of Poland or Slovenia, and even lower than that of the 
Czech Republic, which also has a lower level of protectionism than the EU average. 
It is not just current regulation but also the expectations of EU and accession 
country policies towards agriculture that shape agricultural decisions and, in 
consequence, prices. It would be difficult to argue that food prices in the world are 
set by unfettered markets, therefore one cannot even assume that relative price 
structures today prevailing in the EU will be what transition country relative prices 
will converge towards. The uncertainty regarding the future is clearly very high.  
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Thus, here again, we meet prices that are probably increasing in the medium 
term, but their path is heavily influenced not just by the weather par excellence 
uncertainty factor in agriculture, but also by government policies. With obvious 
modifications the previous conclusion applies here as well: under the present 
circumstances the construction of a government strategy towards agricultural prices 
is a must, if the reduction in uncertainty of future (general) price developments is 
desirable. 
6. Services. These are almost the mirror image of durables, exhibiting a slight, 
but consistently positive, upward trend (Chart 3) and strong internal similarity 
(Chart 3-3). 
It is remarkable that these prices seem to have a rather smooth upward relative 
trend. This phenomenon is not really particular to transition economies, it can be 
observed in several industrial countries, or probably everywhere. The most popular 
explanation (the Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis) relies on differential technological 
growth and wage equalization (See Kovács-Simon (1998)) for some support for 
differential productivity growth in Hungary). Changes in relative demand might 
also play a role. We must also notice that the smooth upward trend is definitely less 
steep than that of administered prices, and is much less noisy than that of either 
administered or food prices. Though the evolution of relative non-tradable prices is 
rather smooth and steady, in no way can we infer that present trends would continue 
ad infinitum. Nevertheless, we can expect only gradual changes in them. 
7. Other tradables. This is in essence a “rest of prices” category. Their average 
relative price has had a slight negative trend (Chart 2), with the individual relative 
prices possessing smooth trends, both negative and positive (Chart 3-8). 
Finally we judged 7 main headings – out of the 160 used by the CSO to calculate 






                                                 
7 Dropped headings include (imputed) rent of owner occupied dwellings (this highly dubious “good” 
accounts for more than 5% of the CPI), rents of local governments’ flats, TV fee (a quasi-tax), gambling 
“prices” and “other services”.  
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Table 2 
Data of the 8 CPI-Subaggregate 
  Basic Headings  Average Weight (1992-99) 
Administered 10  7.00% 
Durable goods  16  8.25% 
(Processed) food  28  15.94% 
Non-processed food  14  7.31% 
Excisable (ABC)  6  16.07% 
Other goods  46  17.14% 
Energy 8  7.25% 
Services 25  11.52% 
Problematic (not included)  7  9.52% 
  160 100.00% 
4.2. The Cross-Sectional Variability of Prices 
Traditionally economists considered the variability of prices as one of the main 
costs of inflation (See Driffill-Mizon-Ulph (1990)). The concept of variability can 
be understood either as the conditional variance of aggregate inflation, or as the 
(cross-sectional) variability of relative prices. There is a general expectation among 
economists to find positive correlation between relative price variability and the 
level of aggregate inflation, and there exists important literature (see, for instance, 
Cukierman (1982)) that formulated hypotheses with respect to the positive 
correlation between relative price variability and variance of aggregate inflation. 
Relative price change distributions are usually found to be non-normal, and this 
was true for our sample, too. Recent models in Ball-Mankiw ((1994), (1995)) drew 
substantial attention among those who examined this problem in the context of 
transition economies. Assuming downward rigidity in prices, relative price changes 
must necessarily mean a rise in the average price level. From a theoretical point of 
view, it is doubtful whether specifically downward rigidity in prices exists. Why 
price reductions may not be very frequent phenomena can be explained provided 
that trend inflation is significantly positive, and changing prices is costly. In that 
case, keeping prices constant is equivalent to decreasing relative prices without 
incurring the costs of price changes. Thus, positive (large) inflation induces 
observed downward rigidity, which might not be present if price stability (zero 
inflation) would be the rule. 
The same model can be used for arguing that higher relative variability of prices 
might give incentives to price makers, in circumstances of costly price changes, to 
price comparatively high, in effect to temporarily increase inflation when relative  
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price uncertainty is high. This idea has found its way into empirical research on 
transition inflation, with Coorey-Mecagni-Offerdal (1998), Pujol-Griffiths (1998), 
Wozniak (1998) reporting evidence in support of this hypothesis on different 
samples. One shortcoming of this literature seems to be its failure to draw a clear 
distinction between relative price variability implied by higher relative price 
uncertainty and that implied by permanent changes in relative prices. The latter 
obviously imparts some variability to cross-sectional relative inflation rates, even if 
that variation is perfectly foreseen. 
Though separating uncertainty and predictability is not easy, some considerations 
may suggest that in transition countries in general, and in Hungary in particular, a 
large portion of relative inflation variability has been due to permanent relative 
price changes, thus it should not be identified with relative price uncertainty. In a 
similar vein high positive skewness of cross-sectional inflation rates, which has 
been found to positively correlate with inflation in the short term, may not be 
attributable to the positive skewness of underlying relative price shocks, as 
demanded by the Ball-Mankiw model, but can be completely foreseen. For 
instance, if it is well known in advance that some government influenced prices will 
be changed at some pre-specified date, then cross sectional skewness may be highly 
positive, but this has nothing to do with the skewness of unexpected relative price 
shocks. 
Chart 4 shows the monthly pattern of basic statistics for the cross-sectional 
distribution of individual price changes. There is large variation, significant non-
normality and little pattern. However, by applying a symmetric 5 % trim one could 
get a clear pattern (see Chart 5), (See the precise definition of trimming in the 
following section). There does not seem to exist any great difference among months 
with respect to skewness and kurtosis, whereas there is a well visible positive 
correlation between the mean and variance. It seems that most of the non-normality  
can be got rid of by trimming 10 %, whereas the close association between the 
mean and variance suggests a non-linear stochastic seasonal pattern in price 
making. 
It would be needless to measure core inflation if relative prices never changed. 
This Section demonstrated that relative price variation has been a significant feature 
of the Hungarian inflationary process. On the other hand this variation has exhibited 
many varieties that do not lend themselves to easy generalization.  
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Thus there is little hope that some simple theory-based of treatment relative price 
changes, and a definition of an optimal core, would be possible. 
5. Computing and Comparing Hungarian Core Inflation Indices 
In this section we examine some proposed core inflation indices for Hungary. 
These include the NBH’s offical core index, the CSO’s core index, a narrow core 
that is obtained by excluding all "volatile" subgroups resulting in about 50 % 
exclusion, an optimal 18 % symmetric trimmed mean (see below), a 5 % symmetric 
trimmed mean, and a 5 %-15 % asymmetric trimmed mean (see the definition 
below). 
The NBH and CSO core inflation indices were given naturally. Our narrow core 
was obtained by keeping the tradable, services, processed food and other non-
durable subcategories. To arrive at the optimal trimmed mean estimator we defined 
the long-run trend in consumer prices by taking a 24-month moving average (We 
did not want to choose a 36-month average and losing too many data points 
thereby). The trend so defined proved to be free of seasonality, but had two large 
outliers in 1994:1 and 1994:3, as two-year window was unable to smooth out the 
large price hikes in 1995:1 and 1995:3. Some basic statistics for the trend and the 













CPI 1.47  1.4  0.66  1.58  8.04 
Trend  CPI  1.52  1.58 0.33 -0.46  2.21 
NBH core  1.43  1.4  0.62  1.48  8.36 
CSO core  1.45  1.4  0.55  1.61  9.1 
Narrow core  1.36  1.3  0.57  1.64  9.92 
Optimal trim  1.09  1.  0.47  2.08  12.91 
5 %  trim  1.27  1.2  0.53  1.68  10.24 
Asymmetric trim  1.45  1.4  0.57  1.65  10.31 
*The underlying data are monthly, seasonally adjusted (except for the trend), and given in percentage 
points. 
Trimmed means are calculated in a way that dropped series - those with the 
lowest and those with the highest index concerning a given month - have the 
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where 
t
u l, ∏  is the l%-u% (asymmetric) trimmed mean of individual inflation rates. 
Here                       is a partition of the 160 base series' parameters such that  
and  l  and u are the trimming bands' width, 
t
i π  is the i-th CPI-representative's 
monthly price change, 
t
i w  is the corresponding weight in the CPI, 
u
t τ  and 
l
t τ corresponds to the series dropped out by the trimming process and  t τ  consists 
of the (indices of the) series left in. 
In order to find an optimal trim, we calculated root mean squared error statistics 
for the deviation between the trend and a number of trimmed means. We included 
also asymmetric trims, with bandwidths between 0 and 20%. 
where            is a trimmed mean with parameters l and u, and            is the trend. 
We selected as the "best" mean squared error estimate the 18% - 18% sym-
metric trim, though the 18% -17% asymmetric trim gave a somewhat better result. 
We added to the list the 5% symmetric trim that proved to have a "smoothing" 
effect on the cross-sectional distribution (see above), and had approximately the 
same exclusion level as the NBH core. The 15%-5% trim was included on an ad 
hoc basis, in order to have a trimmed mean that deviates less than the others from 
the actual CPI on average. Chart 7 shows the different core measures relative to the 
CPI. 
All of the proposed core measures proved to be seasonal, and even after seasonal 
adjustment (with the X11 method) had a large outlier at 1993:1. To assess their 
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Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test, between the seasonally adjusted core 
measure and seasonally adjusted CPI. 2. Computing RMSE with respect to the trend 
as defined above. 3. Running a dynamic regression with the contemporary value 
and four lags of the monthly core index as regressors, and future 1-year CPI 
inflation as regressand. 
With exercise 1 we intend to capture whether the core has a tendency to be 
aligned with the CPI, i.e. with the cost of living index, exercise 2 enables us to 
compare the ability of core measures to track the trend in inflation, whereas 
exercise 3 helps us see whether the core indices are able to provide information on 
future inflation at the 1-year horizon. 
Table 4 contains the results of exercises 1 through 3. 
Table 4 
Performance of core Measures 
 ADF  statistics  RMSE  R
2 in the respective regression 
NBH core  0.13  0.87  0.18 
CSO core  -1.33  0.88  0.21 
Narrow core  0.41  0.7  0.24 
Optimal trim  -1.86  0.76  0.13 
5 % trim  -1.49  0.83  0.16 
Asymmetric trim  -1.7  0.88  0.17 
The following conclusions can be derived from Tables 3 and 4. The NBH core 
and the CSO core are very similar by the statistics, indeed the CSO core fares a 
little bit better. However, as the drug price example demonstrates, the use of interim 
extraneous (qualitative) information, such as the "manual" adjustment applied to the 
NBH core, is a more reasonable procedure than sticking to a predetermined rule at 
every cost. The narrow core measure does a better job than the others at forecasting 
inflation, but none of the core measures seem to be very good at it. Also the narrow 
core produces a measure closest to the trend inflation in the RMSE sense. Though 
the optimal trim is good at tracking trend inflation (almost by definition) it performs 
rather poorly in most other respects, with the exception of having a low variance. 
The asymmetric trim gets the average core inflation closer to the average CPI 
inflation, but is almost indistinguishable in its other features from the exclusion-
type core indices. It is very likely that the NBH and CSO cores are not far from this 
sort of asymmetric trimmed mean. More exclusion tends to underestimate the 
average inflation with respect to actual, suggesting that many temporary hikes in 
individual inflation rates are permanent price level increases. If we insist on having  
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a core measure that cannot deviate too much from the cost of living index in the 
long run, then the selected core index must take into account this requirement. The 
ADF tests suggest that the ratios of core measures to the CPI do not seem to be 
stationary, a result that might be driven by small sample bias in some cases (NBH 
core, CSO core, asymmetric trim), but not for the rest (see Chart 7). 
6. Summary and Evaluation 
In this paper we argued that core inflation has no unanimous definition in the 
literature, though a number of loosely connected requirements that are expected of a 
good "core" have been identified. On the example of Hungary we pursued a 
"functional" approach to core inflation, whereby a core index must contain 
information central bank policy with as little noise as possible. Noise and relative 
price changes are interrelated: noise manifests itself in some relative price variation, 
and changing relative prices makes difficult to disentangle noise from signal. We 
analyzed in detail the nature and reasons of relative price changes in Hungary, and 
concluded that their multiplicity makes it practically impossible to search for a core 
index based on simple theoretical arguments. 
We examined several candidate core inflation indexes and found that none of 
them is perfect. In particular it emerged that smoothness of an index may be 
accompanied by divergence from the CPI in levels, which can give a false signal if 
real exchange rates are an important concern for the central bank. Our investigation 
indicated that it is prudent for the NBH to report and analyze several price indices, 
especially if noise and long-run relative price trends remain present in the data. 
There is no overwhelming reason to give up the "ex food and energy" approach 
even if we know that it is almost necessary that further definition changes will 
happen. However, experimenting with trimmed means must continue, though 
presently it does not seem to be the case that a trimmed mean measure can 
substitute for the official core index. Still, as an alternative, a well-chosen trim can 
be published, if the choice can be clearly explained. Nevertheless, a purely 
statistical approach, based on an unchangeable algorithm, does not seem to be 
feasible for the time being. 
A substantial amount of noise and apparent seasonality have come about because 
of government decisions. Governments must be aware of their responsibility for 
price setting, whenever it exists, indeed in our case, an orderly devolution of this 
responsibility would be preferable to sweeping the problem under the carpet.  
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